This article analyses a new data base on Ucits hedge funds, or alternative Ucits funds. These are EU regulated investment vehicles allowing for a relatively large degree of latitude for fund managers which makes them attractive for hedge fund-like strategies. The asset under management of alternative Ucits funds has seen large capital inows, in contrast to the hedge fund industry as a whole, and was in Q1 2010 managing 83 bn ($121 bn). We examine the performance of these alternative Ucits and compare them to the performance of hedge funds. We do not nd any conclusive evidence that the less regulated hedge funds outperform alternative Ucits funds on a risk adjusted basis, even though we nd some cross-sectional evidence. We also nd a signicant dierence in level of risk between hedge funds and alternative Ucits funds with the latter bearing less risk. This is anticipated due to the limits on risk and leverage under the Ucits regulation.
Introduction
The European Union's (EU) directive on Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (Ucits) is a regulatory framework which permits hedge fund-like investment strategies. The Ucits framework has grown to become popular as an investment vehicle for hedge fund strategies.
For sake of clarity we distinguish hedge fund-like strategies launched under the Ucits framework by referring them as alternative Ucits funds. We nd in this article that the aggregate asset under management (AUM) of this segment have grown 500% during the last 4 years to reach 83 bn in 2010.
This can be compared with the overall hedge fund industry which according to Hedge Fund Research (HFR) grew only 2% over the same period to 1240 bn.
The Ucits brand has become somewhat a seal-of-approval for alternative investments and there is anecdotal evidence that institutional investors focus exclusively on alternative Ucits funds in favor of hedge funds. Furthermore, there are reports that the Ucits brand enjoys much attention outside of Europe from regulators and investors alike.
Launching hedge funds under the Ucits framework is, however, not without dispute. While no precise denition of hedge funds exists, one central concept of this investment vehicle is that they should have large exibility and few restrictions on when and which investment instruments they use to achieve high positive returns.
Despite the large attention alternative Ucits funds have received in the investment community no research has to our knowledge been conducted on the performance of alternative Ucits funds. This article gives a tentative answer by in particular analyzing the dierence in performance between alternative Ucits funds and hedge funds. We focus on three areas for which the Ucits framework may aect the returns. Firstly, restriction on the level of risk and leverage alternative Ucits funds are allowed to take is likely to result in dierent risk and return levels as compared to hedge funds. Secondly, limitations on eligible investment instruments for Ucits should result in dierent risk exposures as compared to hedge funds. Thirdly, higher regulation should provide an investment opportunity set which is less prone to contain funds with extreme returns, to this end we analyses and compare the distribution of return and risk measures of alternative Ucits funds and hedge funds.
Our research is closest to the article by Agarwal, Boyson, and Naik (2009) which examine a dataset of US hedge mutual funds. These are mutual funds which employ hedge fund like strategies but, as in the case with alternative Ucits funds, are under higher regulatory scrutiny. They nd hedge mutual funds to underperform lightly regulated hedge funds and they attribute this to less regulation and more exibility in fee structures which creates better incentive structures for hedge fund managers. There are, however, signicant dierence with their database and the one we use. Alternative Ucits funds in our database have no restrictions on incentive structures. Furthermore, our database is signicantly larger in terms of number of funds and AUM.
Our research is similar to that of Koski and Ponti (1999) , Deli and Varma (2002) and Almazan et al (2004) which investigate the dierences in performance of mutual funds which use and do not use derivatives. Koski and Ponti nd that performance and risk levels are similar between funds with and without derivatives. Furthermore they nd that the added exibility through the use of derivatives enhance the management of risk exposure. The primary contributions of this research are as follows. First we provide with empirical data on the alternative Ucits fund universe. As mentioned above the growth has been large in absolute terms and huge on relative terms with traditional hedge funds.
Secondly, we document the dierences in the return and risk of alternative Ucits funds and of hedge funds. We nd absolute returns to be higher for a composite alternative Ucits index as compared to composite hedge fund indices. Risk-adjusted performance, or alpha, is slightly lower for the Ucits index at 2.6% annually to be compared with 2.9% for the composite hedge fund index. However, the alpha of alternative Ucits index is signicant unlike the alpha for the hedge fund index. We do, however, nd cross-sectional evidence that hedge funds outperform alternative Ucits both in absolute and risk-adjusted terms. Risk levels of alternative Ucits funds are at a 3 to 4 order of magnitude lower than for hedge funds. We furthermore nd alternative Ucits funds to have lower exposures to more risky assets and more illiquid assets than hedge funds.
Finally, we analyze the distribution of various measures on cross-sectional samples of alternative Ucits funds and hedge funds. We use this as a proxy for the characteristics of the investment opportunity set of alternative Ucits funds as compared to the investment opportunity set of hedge funds. Our results support the assertion that there are signicant dierences in the investment opportunity set where the sample of alternative Ucits funds exhibit signicantly lower dispersion in return and risk characteristics than the sample of hedge funds.
This article has the following structure. Section 2 gives an overview of the Ucits regulation. Section 3 presents the data and some empirical data on the industry. Section 4 presents the performance evaluation of alternative Ucits funds. Section 5 concludes.
Hedge funds under the Ucits structure
Ucits was a directive implemented by the European Union (EU) in 1985 aimed to facilitate cross-border marketing of investment funds and maintaining a high level of investor protection. The tenants of the directive are to regulate the organization and oversight of Ucits funds and impose constraint concerning diversication, liquidity, and use of leverage.
The limited denition of permitted assets in the rst Ucits directive in 1985 hampered the interest from asset managers to adopt the fund structure.
This led to the drafting of a new directive in the early 1990s which was in fact never adopted since it was considered too ambitious in scope. However, in the decade following 2000 the EU Commission has adopted and applied several signicant directives which somewhat vaguely is referred to as Ucits III. 1 In particular, the Ucits III structure permits more sophisticated investment strategies like hedge funds to be launched under its structure. In July 2010 the EU Commission adopted a new Ucits directive, often referred to as Ucits IV, with signicant regulatory changes which will apply from July 2011. 2 1 ee gounil hiretive VSGTIIGiigF 2 ee gounil hiretive PHHWGTSGig Since our analysis concerns hedge funds-like strategies launched under the Ucits III structure we will not detail the new Ucits IV directive.
The Ucits framework is more precisely an EU directive and as under the EU constitution this implies that each EU member state is obliged to put a directive into national law before a certain deadline. However, each country has some latitude in how to implement each directive. In the case of the Ucits directive this has led to some signicant regulatory dierences between member states.
It is close at hand to imagine that fund managers go and seek out the most lax implementation of the Ucits directive. However, a report on Ucits by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) in 2008 on behalf of the European Commission would not conrm this. The PwC report found in interviews with Ucits fund managers that the mangers did not take such an approach in selecting Ucits domicile. Instead it was issues as operational presence in fund domicile and the reputation of that domicile. Our own discussions with hedge fund managers to some extent conrm this view. However, the operational presence is not of main concern. It is rather the experience of the regulatory body of a domicile in supporting alternative fund launches which is of prime concern. As shall be apparent in the following section, Luxembourg and to some extent Ireland with increasing pace has for these reasons become the main domicile of alternative Ucits funds.
This section will give a brief overview of Ucits directive and some of its implementations since a complete outline of all EU member state's implementations of the Ucits directive is not in the scope of this article. 
Eligible investment instruments
The Ucits directive is on many accounts vague on the investment instruments which should be eligible for Ucits. In order to clear the ambiguity in the directive the EU commission granted The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) the mandate to issue guidelines (CESR/07-044b) on which investment instruments should be allowed under the Ucits directive.
In general, shares in companies, bonds (government and corporate), and most forms of derivatives on bonds and shares are eligible instruments for Ucits funds. In addition the investment instrument must be easily traded in liquid markets.
3 he interested reder is referred to riewterhousegoopers9 PHHV report on itsF In general, Ucits funds are allowed to synthetically achieve short positions through derivatives. France and Ireland are the exceptions where limited amounts of short selling are allowed. There are, however, additional rules which require the short position to be adequately covered, either by the underlying asset or by an asset which is highly correlated to the underlying.
An exemption in the Ucits directive allows Ucits to hold up to 10%, often called the trash ratio, in non-eligible asset. This in practice allows investments in assets like hedge funds and private equity.
Risk management
The most signicant requirement for a Ucits fund on organizational aspects is that the fund management company must have the operational structure to have a separate risk management team, which is independent of the units in charge of making portfolio management decisions. 4 Ucits funds are required to produce risk reports on a daily basis. The Ucits fund is required to employ a risk-management process which enables it to monitor and mea- Using VaR as a risk-metrics is not without controversy. Firstly, as mentioned before it poorly captures extreme event risk. Secondly, the metric lack an unambiguous estimation process since it relies heavily on the distribution model which is assumed to represent fund returns. Thirdly, the dependencies 5 he exposure of derivtives is lulted s nbr. contracts × nbr. of shares × option's deltaF between securities returns in the portfolio heavily inuence VaR values and the choice to model this highly inuence the dependencies estimation. 
Concentration and counterparty risk
The Ucits directive stipulate an array of rules concerned with concentration and counterparty risk. 7 These rules are in general the same in regulatory implementations across member states. The more signicant investment limit rules are that exposure to any security or money market instruments by the same issuer may not exceed 10% of NAV, and in combination with derivatives it may not exceed 20% of NAV. Special rules applies to securities or money market instruments which are issued or guaranteed by a member state of the EU where the maximum exposure is 35% of NAV.
Fund of funds are possible to structure under Ucits regulations. In a Ucits fund of funds, the individual holding of other funds is capped at 20%
of NAV. Furthermore, in aggregate they are allowed to hold no more than 30% of NAV in non-Ucits funds.
Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives are to large degree eligible investments for Ucits funds. However, there are some regulations to limit the counterparty risk towards the issuer of the derivative. Ucits fund are regulated to limit any individual OTC derivative transaction to not exceed 10% of NAV if the counterparty is a credit institution. The total exposure on all transactions towards one issuer is limited to 20%. There are, however, exceptions to these regulations where Ucits are allowed to net their positions on OTC derivatives.
6 ee wxeilD preyD nd imrehts @PHHSA for n extensive overview of using s risk mesureF 7 In practice this means that they are advised to consider such liquidity related factors as bid-ask spread and quality of secondary market. They are specically required to be able to allow 20% of NAV to be redeemed at any point. The fund is required to value their investments at least twice a month. Illiquid instrument are allowed to be held (up to 10% of NAV) as long as the fund is able to meet foreseeable redemption requests.
The liquidity oered to clients is at least twice a month. There are regulations concerning derivatives which demand daily liquidity which cause many alternative Ucits funds to keep this level of liquidity to clients. However, some funds impose a 5-days notice period thus clients eectively have something closer to weekly liquidity. Despite the notice period, these liquidity frequency is far higher than the monthly or quarterly liquidity oered by hedge funds in general.
Ucits are allowed to impose gates provisions under unusual market conditions which caught some investors with surprise during the nancial crises of 2008. The gates provision is, however, capped at 10% of net asset value and can only extend over the oered liquidity period times ten.
Transparency
Ucits funds are required to provide NAV to authorities at least twice a week and publish them at least twice a month to investors. The fund is also required to provide various publications in order facilitate adequate information as basis for investment decision. In particular they must provide a simplied prospectus which gives a short denition of the Ucits' objectives, a brief assessment of the fund's risk prole, and historical performance. ceased operations. However, in our analysis we have excluded these three funds. Our analysis is focused on funds denominated in EUR for the natural reason that these funds constitute the major share of funds in the database.
The UAI database providors employ multiple rules when including a new fund in the database. In brief, the fund has to comply with the most recent Ucits regulation. The fund should furthermore be able to take short positions, target absolute returns and charge performance fees. 
Data biases
Hedge fund databases suer in general from three biases, mostly arising from the opaque and unregulated nature of the industry. As shall be detailed below, our database is to a somewhat less extent aected by these biases.
Selection bias is due to the selection process of data vendors where they are the ones who seek out and decide, with the consent of hedge fund managers, which funds to include in the database. Thus, there is no guarantee that the data vendor covers the whole universe of hedge funds. In the case of the UAI database; as long as Ucits funds concur with UAI's selection criteria they will be included in the database. Importantly, selection bias is not induced by a hedge fund manager's interest to be included or not. Instant-history bias is due to hedge fund managers' strong incentive to put up hedge funds on a trial period and if returns are not stellar they never report the returns to the data vendor. Instant-history bias does not exist in the UAI database since Ucits fund managers do not have this exibility. To be compared with that of the whole hedge fund industry which over the same period only grew around 2% (in euro terms) from 1210 bn($1464 bn) to 1240 bn ($1668 bn) according to HFR Industry Report Q1 2010. 10 10 he rp nd es dtse re not distintly di'erent dt sesD hene prt of the growth in rp dtse is indeed ttriuted to in)ows in lterntive its fundsF 12 xegtive hrpe rtios re miguous to ompre oherently nd we thus refrin from ny omprisons of theseF 
where r t is the annualized excess return, SP500 t is the annualized excess return of S&P 500, SML t is the annualized dierence between the return of the Russell 2000 and S&P 500, Bond t is the month-end to month-end change (with inverted sign) in the excess return of the 10 year treasury constant maturity yield, Credit t is the month-end to month-end change (with inverted sign) of the dierence between the Moody's Baa and the 10 year treasury constant maturity yield, BdOpt t is excess return of a portfolio of bond lookback straddles, FXOpt t is excess return of a portfolio of currency lookback straddles, ComOpt t is excess return of a portfolio of commodity lookback straddles. Excess return implies returns above the 1-month libor USD rate.
Data on equity factors and libor is provided by Reuters 3000, on bond factor by Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve System and on lookback straddles from David Hsieh's data Library. 13 The initial time-series of the alternative Ucits funds and indices are denominated in EUR. To coherently use the seven factor model which is denominated in USD we consider, as before, an investor who is fully hedged towards currency risk. That is, calculating EUR return time-series in excess of the 1-month EUR libor rate. We also consider an investor who is unhedged towards currency risk, thus converting the EUR return time-series to USD using the USD/EUR exchange rate.
13 he dtse n e found t httpXGGfultyFfuquFdukeFeduG £ dhUGhtvirryGpE pegFxls nd pung nd rsieh @PHHIA provides more informtion on their onstrutionF Ucits alternative global index). This is a relatively high explanatory power for hedge fund return series. However, the R 2 level also call for some caution in making statistical inference from the model. The top panel in table 7 presents results on the Ucits alternative global, HFRI composite, HFRI fund of funds, and HFRX investable equal weighted strategy index. Except for the unhedged UCITS Alternative Global Index, none of the indices have Figure 2 The cumulative return of the Ucits alternative Global, HFRI Composite, HFRI Fund of Funds, and S&P 500. index. The result is similar for the UCITS Alternative Global Index returns in excess of the HFRI fund of funds index returns. The one exception, however, is with regards to the small cap factor where the dierence is highly signicant. The dierence is as before likely to be explained by regulatory constraints that can deter alternative Ucits funds to invest in small cap stocks which tend to be illiquid.
Cross-sectional dierences
We devote this section to compare the cross-sectional performance of alternative Ucits funds and hedge funds from the Tass and Barclays' database on hedge funds. We study the mean performance and dispersion of three groups of alternative Ucits funds, namely: long/short equity, macro, and xed income. These represent the largest groups of alternative Ucits funds and hence form an adequate sample size for our analysis. We compare the results from these funds with hedge funds from the Tass and Barclays data base using similar strategy. Table 8 Number of alternative Ucits funds and hedge funds across strategies in the sample. 14 wore preisely the hedge funds in the ss dtse leled sX longGshort equity hedgeD glol mroD nd (xed inome ritrgeY nd the hedge funds in the frlys dtse leled sX equity longGshort @vGAD vG growth orientedD vG opportunistiD vG vlue orientedD (xed inome @psA efGseF lonsD ps ritrgeD ps onvertile ondsD ps diversi(edD ps high yieldD ps mortgge kedD nd mroF The left panel in table 10 presents the dispersion of the group of long/short equity hedge funds and alternative Ucits funds. For all measures, the hypothesis that they have equal dispersion is rejected on at least the 95% condence level. In all cases it is the group of hedge funds which exhibit higher level of dispersion.
Distributional properties
The results for global macro funds, presented in the mid panel of table 10 , indicate that levels of dispersion is of similar magnitude with the group of hedge funds and alternative Ucits funds. It is only on the measure of kurtosis which the hypothesis of equal standard deviations in the group of alternative Ucits funds and hedge funds is rejected.
The right panel in table 10 presents the dispersion of the group of xed income hedge funds and alternative Ucits funds. The dispersion in the two groups for measures of annualized mean returns and standard deviation is large and diers by a factor of 4 to 5, where the alternative Ucits funds exhibit lower levels of dispersions. This result is also highly signicant where the hypothesis of equal dispersion is rejected at the 99.9% level. However, the hypothesis that dispersion of kurtosis and skewness is equal for the two groups cannot be rejected.
These results concur with previous results in that hedge funds are a more heterogeneous group in terms of performance than alternative Ucits funds.
Conclusion
This article oers, to our knowledge, a rst comprehensive overview of the dierences and similarities of alternative Ucits funds and hedge funds.
Our results give a mixed picture of the benets and shortfalls of using either fund group. The lower attrition rate of alternative Ucits funds is indicative of how Ucits investors are less exposed to fund failure risk. However, given the short sample period this result is based on it still remains to be seen if this level will be sustained.
In terms of excess returns we tend to nd mixed results. Over the pe- The Ucits regulation provides strict rules of holding illiquid assets as well as providing clients with a high frequency of liquidity. The latter certainly explains dierences in exposures between the two categories of investment vehicles, with hedge funds for instance being more exposed to credit and small cap factors. While it may be benecial for clients to frequently being able to invest or redeem money in a fund it also prohibits exposure to the risk and rewards of holding illiquid investments. There is consequently a need to nd an appropriate regulatory framework for illiquid investment vehicles as well.
Our results show that hedge funds are a more heterogeneous group in terms of performance than alternative Ucits funds. This has important implication on investors fund selection process, where the Ucits regulatory framework seems to limit the dispersion of performance.
Hence, will alternative Ucits funds replace hedge funds or must they be added to the pallet of existing products? Our results indicate that for the time being both alternative Ucits funds and hedge funds will remain because they have distinctly dierent characteristics which bring value to dierent investment objectives. Alternative Ucits as a group oers better liquidity terms, show lower attrition rate, and exhibit lower dispersion of return. Yet, none of these characteristics can guarantee high performance. Furthermore, our results need to be considered in the light of the short sample period with very particular economic conditions. However, the alternative Ucits segment is still in its infancy but if it fails to deliver investors will end up paying high fees for mediocre performance ... and it then remains to be seen if arguments regarding better liquidity terms or better regulatory protection than Hedge
Funds will then ease their pain.
